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THE WARREN COURT: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
Paul G. Kauper*
J.

BACKGROUND TO THE WARREN ERA

Warren Court will be remembered for a number of reasons,
but for many Americans it is distinctively and immediately
identified as the tribunal which put an end to prayer and Biblereading exercises in the public schools. These cases were among the
Court's most highly publicized decisions; they probably generated
as much discussion, controversy, and criticism of the Court as the
school desegregation, legislative reapportionment, and police interrogation decisions. The prayer and Bible-reading cases stood out
among a relatively small but significant body of decisions in which
the Warren Court was called upon to interpret the twin clauses in
the opening language of the first amendment: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . . ." The purpose of this Article is to analyze the holdings of the Warren Court under these two clauses in
an attempt to assess their significance by reference both to earlier
interpretations and to the direction they may give to future development.
Some propositions had been well established before the era of
the ·warren Court. Fundamental to any consideration of the Supreme Court's treatment of religious liberty was the determination
that the fourteenth amendment made the first amendment applicable to the states. Whatever the theory-whether a fundamental
rights interpretation OF -an incorporation theory-the Court in the
pre-Warren period had made clear that the free exercise principle
explicitly stated in the first amendment as a restriction on Congress
was equally applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment.1 The Court also left no doubt that the establishment limitation served as a restriction on the states.2
The dimensions of religious liberty, as epitomized in the free
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2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l (1947).
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exercise guarantee, had been well explored by the Supreme Court
before Chief Justice Warren's tenure began. In a notable series of
cases primarily involving claims asserted by Jehovah's Witnesses, the
Court-whether resting its decisions on free speech and free press,
on a concept of intellectual liberty distilled from the first amendment, or distinctively on religious liberty itself-had opened up a
wide area for the expression and propagation of religious ideas.3
Moreover, the cases had established that restrictions on religious
liberty would not be lightly countenanced and would not be permitted except in cases presenting a clear and present danger to
important public interests.4 These cases suggested that religious liberty stood at the apex of the first amendment and was, indeed, a
"preferred freedom."
By contrast, the interpretation of the establishment limitation
had given rise to a limited amount of litigation before the Court
prior to the Warren era. Three important cases had turned on the
interpretation of this limitation. In Everson v. Board of Education/•
the Court held that a state could reimburse parents for the cost of
transporting their children by bus to a parochial school. In reaching
this result and in stating its interpretation of the establishment
limitation, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, enunciated
the famous doctrine that the establishment clause does more than
prohibit an established church or _preferential treatment for one
or more religions. According to him, this limitation prohibited
government from giving any aid to religion, including public spending "to support any religious activities, or institutions whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion." 6 Quoting Thomas Jefferson, Justice Black said that the
establishment clause was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State." 7 In short, the first amendment embodies
the separation principle. However, New Jersey had not breached the
wall in the Everson case, since its purpose was not to aid religious
education but to promote the valid public welfare purpose of providing safe transportation for children attending parochial schools.
Thus the Court laid the foundation for the "secular purpose" doc3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See P. KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 107-12 (1956).
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
330 U.S. at 16.
330 U.S. at 16.
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trine in the interpretation of the establishment limitation: government may advance lawful secular purposes with its spending programs even though this may result in some incidental benefit to a
religious group or activity.
The Everson dictum was translated into a concrete holding in
the McCollum 8 decision; the Court held unconstitutional a program
whereby public school children were "released" one hour a week
for religious instruction given on the school premises during the
regular school day by teachers supplied by the religious communities. According to the Court, the state was using its public school
program as a means of recruiting children for religious instruction
and subjecting them to pressure to attend these classes.
Shortly thereafter, the Court in Zorach v. Clauson9 sharply limited .McCollum by holding that a state could promote a plan of
released time for religious instruction where the instruction did not
take place on the school premises, even though in other respects the
plan resembled the one invalidated in McCollum. As the dissenters
pointed out, 10 the decision could hardly be reconciled with the basic
rationale of !11cCollum; moreover, the emphasis of Justice Douglas'
majority opinion was a striking departure from Justice Black's opinions in Everson and McCollum. Observing that "[w]e are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,"11 Justice
Douglas said that the state may properly respect the religious nature
of our people and accommodate the public service to their spiritual
needs. Thus, in Zorach the Court laid the foundation for the
"accommodation theory": a state may, consistent with the establishment limitation, act in a positive way to accommodate its institutions and programs in order to provide the opportunity for its citizens to cultivate religiql!s interests. "While the decision in no sense
suggests that parents could demand as a matter of constitutional
right a program of released time, its basic reasoning was indicative
of the problems awaiting the Court in reconciling possible conflicts
between the free exercise guarantee and the establishment proscription. Both the holding and the tenor of the opinion led some to
believe that the Court was retreating substantially from the hard
line of separation which characterized Everson and McCollum. Thus
8. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
9. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
10. 343 U.S. at 316 (Justice Black). 322-23 (Justice Frankfurter), 325 (Justice Jackson).
11. 343 U.S. at 313.
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after Zorach was decided in 1952, it was possible to speculate that
the Court was moving to a softer position which would permit state
programs supportive of religion as long as there was no preferential
treatment of any religious group and no coercion of dissenters.
!I.

THE WARREN COURT AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

Five cases decided by the Warren Court fall into the general
category of free exercise of religion. In Kreshik v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church,12 the Court held that
it was an impairment of religious liberty for the New York courts
to transfer control over St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City
from the central governing authority of the Russian Orthodox
Church to a group which had established an independent Russian
Church of America. Soon thereafter, the Court in Torcaso v. Watkins13 declared unconstitutional a provision of the Maryland Constitution requiring a justice of the peace to take an oath that he
believed in God as a condition of taking office. In Braunfeld v.
Brown14 the Court held that a Sunday closing law did not violate
the religious liberty of sabbatarians. But in the later case of Sherbert v. Verner, 15 the Court distinguished Braunfeld and held invalid
a feature of the South Carolina unemployment compensation law
which, as interpreted by the state supreme court, required denial of
unemployment compensation benefits to a person who refused a job
requiring Saturday employment because of sabbatarian convictions.
And for reasons pointed out below, United States v. Seeger16 should
also be included among the Warren Court's free exercise decisions
even though it did not rest on constitutional grounds. The Court
there held that a person could qualify for a statutory exemption as
a conscientious objector under the selective service laws on the basis
of religious training and belief-defined by statute as "belief in
relation to a Supreme Being"17-despite the fact that he did not
profess belief in God in the orthodox sense.
12. 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
13. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
14. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
15. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
16. United States v. Seeger, also the companion cases, United States v. Jakobson,
Peter v. United States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
17. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1964). This definition was eliminated in the 1967 amendments to the selective service statute. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (Supp. III), am~nding
50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1964).
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The decision in Kreshik, which dealt with the freedom of
churches as corporate bodies,18 may be contrasted with the remaining free exercise cases during the Warren era, which bore distinctively on the religious liberty of the individual; attention in the
discussion below will be centered on the latter cases. By invalidating
the :Maryland oath requirement as a condition of public office,
Torcaso in effect incorporated into the free exercise clause as a limitation on the states the express limitation in the body of the Constitution that no religious test shall be required as a qualification
for any office under the United States.19 The case may be viewed as
resting on the simple proposition that no person may be discriminated against on religious grounds in the enjoyment of public office
or privilege. While this appears elementary, several curious aspects
of the opinion give it a special significance. Justice Black, in his
review of the precedents, repeated passages from Everson and
McCollum, thereby indicating that the Court was not retreating
from the interpretation previously given to the establishment limitation. But strangely the Court did not explicitly rest its decision on
the establishment clause, as it might well have done since freedom
from coercion to accept an officially prescribed religious belief seems
clearly to be a central value served by that provision. Moreover,
Justice Black's observation that the effect of the oath was to
favor those who profess a particular kind of religion-namely those
who preferred a belief in God as against persons professing nontheistic religious beliefs20-points again to what readily appears as
an argument under the establishment limitation as interpreted in
Everson. Yet the Court formally grounded its decision on the free
exercise limitation.21 This suggests that both the free exercise and
establishment clauses p_rotect against discrimination on religious
grounds in the enjoyment of public privilege; it also indicates that
the free exercise clause protects both belief and nonbelief. Moreover,
the famous footnote in Justice Black's opinion, documenting his
18. Kreshik was significant in that it extended to judicial action the previous holding in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N.
America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), which had invalidated legislative interference with ecclesiastical affairs. The Court thereby converted the old federal common-law doctrine of
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872), into a constitutional rule. See Casad,
The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical .Movement, 62 MICH. L. REV. 419
(1964).
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. !.
20. 367 U.S. at 490.
21. 367 U.S. at 496.
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point that the oath requirements gave a preference to a particular
kind of religious belief, suggests a definition of religion which encompasses secular and humanistic beliefs and ideologies in addition
to the traditional types of theistic belief.22
Seeger and its companion cases should be considered at this point
for their bearing on Torcaso. The distinctive thing about Seeger is
that the Court by tour de force interpreted "belief in relation to a
Supreme Being"-required by statute as an element of the showing
of religious belief and training necessary to sustain a claim of conscientious objector status23-to include any ethical belief which
parallels the conventional belief in God as a source of moral duty.
While Seeger rested on statutory grounds, it clearly had constitutional overtones, since a construction which limited exemption as
a conscientious objector to persons resting their moral convictions
on conventional theistic grounds would have been subject to attack
under Torcaso as a discrimination against persons holding nontheistic ethical beliefs. Taken together, the Torcaso and Seeger opinions point to the conclusion that at least for purposes of the free
exercise clause, the term "religion" embraces a wide variety of ethical beliefs, whether founded on theistic concepts or not; that a broad
freedom of conscience comes within the protection of the free exercise clause; and that by virtue of the first amendment no preference
may be granted or discrimination practiced by reference to a particular kind of religious belief as sanctioned by law.
Braunfeld and Sherbert are probably .the most interesting cases
of the Warren period on the issue of religious liberty. They deal
basically with the same problem: whether or not th~ free exercise
clause protects a person against the indirect re-straint on his religious
liberty which results when the application of a generally valid law
places him at a special disadvantage because of his adherence to
religious duty. Since this problem does not involve governmental
acts which directly restrict religious acts or discriminate explicitly
on religious grounds, it falls outside the range of the familiar types
of restrictions on religious liberty. The issue in Braunfeld was
whether orthodox Jews and others who because of religious conviction observe a day of rest other than Sunday must be exempted from
22. "Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be
considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture,
Secular Humanism and others." 367 U.S. at 495 n.11.
23. See note 17 supra.
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the coverage of a Sunday closing law. If such an exemption is
denied, sabbatarians who observe both secular and religious law
would be subjected to an economic disadvantage since they would
be required to close their businesses two days per week. In Braunfeld
the Court refused to go along with this economic discrimination
argument; it chose to recognize the secular purpose served by Sunday closing laws and the importance of having a single day of rest
prescribed by law. The Court emphasized that the restraint on religious liberty was an indirect one and asserted that substantial policy
considerations militated against creating an exemption in favor of
those who for religious reasons observe another day of rest.24 Pointing to the administrative problems of policing a Sunday closing law
with a recognized exemption based on religious obligation, the
majority held the state was not constitutionally required to grant
such an exemption.25 Justice Brennan's strong dissent, supported by
Justice Stewart, registered the view that this was a burden on the
free exercise of religion which could not be justified by any compelling state interest.26
Braunfeld was sharply restricted, if not devitalized, by the later
holding in Sherbert that South Carolina had violated the free exercise clause in the administration of its unemployment compensation
law by cutting off unemployment compensation payments to a Seventh D ...y Adventist who had refused a job requiring Saturday work.
According to the Court, the law forced the sabbatarian to make a
choice between adhering to her religion and enjoying a public
benefit; thus, the effect of the law was to discriminate against persons
with religious objections to Saturday work.21 The Court emphasized
that only a compelling state interest warrants a restriction on religious liberty, 28 and the ,case makes clear that this standard is equally
applicable to so-called indirect restraints on religious freedom.
Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion, attempted to distinguish the Braunfeld case on the ground that the same public
24. !166 U.S. at 606-09.
25. !166 U.S. at 608-09.
26. 366 U.S. at 610, 616. Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds both that the

Sunday closing laws were laws establishing religion and that in so far
pelled observance by sabbatarians they violated the free exercise clause.
27. The South Carolina law did recognize the position of a person
to working on Sundays on religious grounds, and the Court in support
sion could, therefore, use the further argument that the law thereby
against persons whose religion required a different day of rest.
28. !174 U.S. at 406.

as they comwho objected
of its concludiscriminated
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policy considerations that justified a state in not exempting sabbatarians from a Sunday closing law were not present here.29 Justices
Douglas30 and Stewart31 in their concurring opinions, and Justice
Harlan in his dissent,82 indicated that they were not persuaded by
this effort. Indeed, as Justice Harlan observed, the economic burden
placed on the sabbatarian who complies with a Sunday closing law
is greater than that suffered by an individual who is denied unemployment benefits for a restricted period of time.33
Perhaps it is only a matter of time before the Court reconsiders
Braunfeld; in any event, the Sherbert case stands out as probably
the landmark case during the Warren period on the question of
religious liberty. The result of the Court's decision is to protect
discrete minorities against laws which, while serving valid public
purposes, have the effect of putting these groups at a special disadvantage. Equally important is -the general proposition formulated
in Sherbert that only compelling state interests warrant measures
which substantially infringe upon the free exercise of religion. The
impact of this formulation is evident in later cases decided by other
courts.84 Indeed, in view of its strong stand in Sherbert, it is surprising that the Court refused to review the Kansas Supreme Court's
decision in Kansas v. Garber, 35 the Amish school case, thus passing
up the opportunity to deal with the important issues of religious
liberty raised therein.

III. THE wARREN COURT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Three important cases distinctively turning on the interpretation
of the establishment clause were decided during the period under
29. 374 U.S. at 408-09.
30. 374 U.S. at 411-12.
31. 374 U.S. at 417-18.
32. 374 U.S. at 421.
33. 374 U.S. at 421.
34. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (A state narcotics
law could not constitutionally be applied to penalize the use by a California Indian
tribe of peyote as part of a religious ceremony.); In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125
N.W.2d 588 (1963) (A Jehovah's Witness could not be required to serve on a jury
where this ran counter to religious conviction). See also Galanter, Religious Freedoms
in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. R.Ev. 217; Gianella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part I, The Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1381 (1967).
35. 197 Kansas 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 389 U.S.
51 (1967). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Fortas were of the opinion
that probable jurisdiction should have been noted.
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the right of the Amish parents founded on
religious considerations to direct the education of their children after reaching high
school age was subordinate to the state's power to insure ":'hat it regarded as proper
minimum education for all children in the state.
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review. In Engel v. Vitale 36 and Schempp v. School District of A bington Township, 31 prayer and Bible-reading exercises in the public
schools were condemned as a form of establishment.38 Supplying
textbooks free of charge to parochial school children was upheld in
Board of Education v. Allen.39 In addition, the Court upheld the
validity of Sunday closing laws. 40 To these decisions must be added
the recent holding in Flast v. Cohen41 that a federal taXpayer has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal spending
alleged to violate the establishment limitation. To complete the
picture, it should be noted that the Court passed up opportunities
to review state court cases dealing with the validity of governmental
grants to church-related colleges42 and the validity of tax exemptions
for property used for religious purposes. 43
The cases dealing with religious exercises in public schools and
state-financed distribution of textbooks to parochial school children
have perhaps the greatest impact and long-run significance in terms
of the substantive interpretation of the establishment clause. As previously observed, the prayer and Bible-reading cases, declaring invalid practices which had long been sanctioned in a number of states,
attracted great attention and provoked widespread public controversy. These dtcisions generated charges that the Warren Court was
godless and hostile to religion and led to a substantial, but in the
end unsuccessful, movement in support of a constitutional amend!16. !170 U.S. 421 (1962).
!17. !174 U.S. 20!1 (196!1). See also the companion case, Murray v. Curlett, !174 U.S. 20!1
(196!1).
!18. In Engel the Court held that the daily use in New York schools of the socalled Regents' Prayer violated the establishment clause. At the next term in the
Schempp and Murray cases the Court broadened the Engel holding to include Biblereading and the recitation Qf. the Lord's Prayer. Justice Stewart wrote dissenting
opinions in these cases.
!19. !192 U.S. 2!16 (1968).
40. McGowan v. Maryland, !166 U.S. 420 (1961).
41. !192 U.S. 8!1 (1968).
42. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that capital grants by the legislature to
church-related colleges which the Court found to be "sectarian" institutions, violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment. Horace Mann League of the United
States v. Board of Public Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966), cert. denied, !185
U.S. 97 (1966). Justices Harlan and Stewart were of the opinion that certiorari should
have been granted.
4!1. The California, Rhode Island, and Maryland courts held that such exemptions did not violate the establishment clause. Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46
Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed sub nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda,
!152 U.S. 921 (1956) Uustices Black and Frankfurter dissenting); Gene_ral Fin. Corp. v.
Archetto, 176 A.2d 7!1 (R.I. 1961), appeal dismissed, !169 U.S. 42!1 (1962) Uustice Black
dissenting); Murray v. Comptroller of Treasury, 241 Md. !18!1, 216 A.2d 897, cert.
denied, Murray v. Goldstein, !185 U.S. 816 (1966).
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ment to validate the practices held unconstitutional by the Court,H
These cases definitely established the secular character of the public
schools as a constitutional requirement; they also suggested questions about the validity of all religious observances in public life.
Equally important, however, was that in Schempp the Court made
clear that the objective study of religion and of the Bible in its literary and historical aspects is properly a part of public education. This
recognition gave a special positive significance to these cases.
The Allen case, which upheld the public lending of secular textbooks free of charge to children in parochial schools, is significant
not only because it affirms and extends the secular-purpose doctrine
of Everson, but also because it suggests openings for other types of
federal and state programs designed to provide benefits to churchrelated institutions or students attending church-related schools. The
decision has great relevance for federal spending programs already
underway and for similar state programs already adopted or under
consideration.45
In the long run, the Flast case may turn out to be the Warren
Court's most important decision on church-state problems. The issue
was whether a federal taxpayer has standing to challenge a federal
appropriation on the ground that it violates the establishment
clause. In Frothingham v. Mellon, 46 decided in 1923, the Court had
held that a federal taxpayer did not have the requisite interest to
challenge spending for a purpose allegedly beyond the legislative
competence of Congress. It has been commonly assumed since Frothingham that the. case stood as a bar to any suit -ay a federal taxpayer
to challenge federal spending on constitutional or statutory grounds.
But in Flast the Court limited Frothingham by holding that a federal taxpayer does have standing to . challenge federal spending
44. On various proposals to amend the Constitution to permit prayer and Biblereading exercises in the public schools, see Proposed Amendments to the Constitution
Relating to School Prayers, Bible Reading, etc., L1. Staff Study for the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Committee Print 1964); Hearings on Proposed
Amendments to the Constitution Relating to Prayers and Bible Reading in the
Public Schools Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
See also Note, School Prayer and the Becker Amendments, 53 Gi::o. L.J. 192 (1964).
45. Pennsylvania recently enacted legislation authorizing grants to private schools
as a contribution to the cost of providing secular educational services. Act. No. 109, 24
P.S. §§ 5601-09 Reg. Sess. (1968), 3 PURDON's PENNSYL\'ANIA LE:GISLATI\'E Sl:RVICE 232
(1968). A proposal to authorize limited tuition grants to parents sending children to
private schools was introduced at the recent session of the Michigan legislature. S.B.
1124 Reg. Sess. (1968).
46. 262 us. 447.
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allegedly violative of the establishment clause, since this clause is a
specific limitation on Congress and impliedly creates a right in federal taxpayers to be free from spending which amounts to an establishment of religion. By finding such a right in the taxpayer, the
Court actually built on a substantive interpretation in order to meet
the remedial problem.47 The specific holding in Flast is particularly
significant since, until this decision, the Frothingham doctrine had
barred litigation instituted by taxpayers challenging the use of federa_l funds, under authority of statutes directed to general welfare
purposes, to aid church-related activities or institutions. We may
now expect a spate of federal cases challenging such uses of funds.
Perhaps decisive answers will soon be forthcoming to questions
which have been the subject of prolonged controversy but which
have gone unresolved for lack of a proper party to present the issue.
An incidental effect of the decision may be to put an end to proposals for legislation which would expressly vest federal courts with
jurisdiction to hear taxpayers' suits challenging federal appropriations on first amendment grounds.48
"What contributions, if any, did the Warren Court make to the
doctrinal development of the establishment clause? One thing is
quite clear: the notion which developed after the Zorach case that
the Court was about to engage in a general retreat from ideas expressed in Everson and McCollum proved to be ill-founded. At least
the ·warren Court has taken occasion in its opinions to reaffirm general ideas expressed in earlier decisions indicating a hard line on
separation. Whether the Court means what it says, and whether
everything it says can be reconciled with its holdings is another
matter. The Court's tendency to cite and quote from prior decisions
in cases raising the esta'bUshment issue obscures the doctrinal development. For instance, in the Torcaso case, which appeared formally
to rest on the free exercise clause, Justice Black reviewed his prior
47. Dilution of the standing requirement in establishment cases was evident already
in the prayer and Bible-reading cases where the Court held that it was not necessary
to prove an invasion of personal freedom in order to challenge a school practice on
establishment grounds. Parents objecting to these religious practices brought the
suits in these cases. Justice Black in Engel did not even discuss standing, Justice Clark
and Justice Brennan mentioned the standing problems in footnotes in their opinions
in Schempp (374 U.S. at 224 n.9, 266 n.30).
48. Senator Ervin proposed such legislation in 1966. See Hearings on S. 2097 Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). For discussion of the proposed legislation, see Editorial Note,
The Insular Status of the Religion Clauses: The Dilemma of Standing, 36 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 648 (1968).
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opinions in Everson and Mccollum and found in them support for
the idea that the state cannot involve itself in religious matters by
prescribing a religious test for public office. And, in stating its position on the establishment clause in the Sunday closing cases, the
Court reviewed at length the earlier cases from Everson through
Zorach, again suggesting that it was not rejecting the prior learning.
In the end, of course, the Court found the Sunday closing laws valid
on the basis of the exception to the separation principle suggested
in the Everson case itself: that laws directed toward secular ends are
valid even though they result in incidental benefits for religious
purposes. In this sense the Sunday closing cases added no new doctrinal development and simply affirmed the basic rationale of the
Everson holding. It should be noted, however, that both Chief Jus·tice Warren in his majority opinion49 and Justice Frankfur~r in his
extended concurring opinion50 did suggest the further consideration
that even a law which incidentally aids religion while furthering a
secular purpose may be invalid if alternatives are open to the state
for achieving the same result without conferring this incidental benefit. Justice Brennan also referred to this test in his extended concurring opinion in the Schempp case, 51 discussed below. The alternative-means approach has important implications as a limitation
on the secular-purpose doctrine, but it remains to be determined
whether this test has assumed a definitive significance in the interpretation of the establishment clause. If it has attained such a significance, it is still unclear how the test is to be applied in a variety
of situations.
The school prayer and Bible-reading cases offer the greatest insight into the Court's current thinking about the establishment
clause. In the first case, Engel v. Vitale, 52 the Court dealt rather
simply with the New York Regents' prayer by saying that a statute
which prescribed a prayer for daily use in the public schools violated
a fundamental purpose of the establishment clause, which was designed· to prohibit governmental sanction for any kind of religious
belie£ or practice. Justice Black's opinion was notable because, except for one brief reference to the Everson case in a footnote, it
completely lacked documentation. This suggested that while speak49.
50.
51.
52.

366
366
374
370

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 450-52.
at 466-67.
at 294-95.
421 (1962).
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ing for the majority of the Court in writing an opinion designed to
secure as much support as possible, he was not disposed to give interpretations of prior cases which might alienate such support. Obviously any reliance on AlcCollum, which some felt would have justified the result, would have required an attempt to distinguish
Zorach. But Justice Black did make the important point that it was
not necessary for the petitioners, who were parents, to show that
there was an invasion of religious liberty; since the establishment
clause is an independent ground for d_ecision, a showing that the
challenged practice also violates the free exercise clause is not required. 53
The Schempp case, 54 which followed in quick succession and
which dealt with the issue of both prayer and Bible-reading in the
public schools, was far more revealing in terms of the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause. Justice Clark, writing for the
majority, reviewed all the prior cases and did not suggest any basic
incompatibility between McCollum and Zorach. While reaffirming
the holding in Engel that the establishment clause prohibits ritualistic exercises in the public schools, even though attendance is voluntary, he went on at great length to justify the Court's conclusions in
the case before it and to allay fears that the Court was intent on an
antireligious course with respect to the public schools. He affirmed
the view that for the purpose of raising an establishment clause
question it was not necessary to prove a violation of religious liberty.
The really critical part of his establishment interpretation, however,
appeared in that part of the opinion stating that what the first
amendment requires is neutrality. 55 This marks the first time that
neutrality as a central canon of interpretation appeared in the cases.
Justice Black had alreqqy mentioned neutrality in Everson; he said
that if the state elected to be neutral as between children attending
public and parochial schools in the matter of providing bus transportation the Court could not say that this was unconstitutional. 56
The Court would not force the state, in administering a program
aimed at the safe transportation of school children, to discriminate
against children going to parochial schools. And Justice Douglas in
Zorach stated that government must be neutral on the issue of com53. 370 U.S. at 430.
54. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, also Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S.
203 (1963).

55. 374 U.S. at 215, 222-27.
56. 330 U.S. at 17-18.

282

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:269

petition between sects.07 But it was in Schempp that neutrality, as
opposed to separation, assumed a position of primary importance in
the interpretation of the establishment clause.
This was a significant development, in part because neutrality
had been proposed by several writers as the authoritative guide to
interpretation. Professor Katz had stated that the underlying purpose
of both religion clauses is to promote religious liberty; that separation is a subordinate instrumental concept to achieve this purpose;
and that while the establishment clause requires government to be
neutral as between religion and nonreligion, this neutrality must be
interpreted in the light of the free exercise clause. Thus, neutrality
cannot be used as a basis for denying the free exercise of religion or
for discriminating on a religious basis in the dispensation of public
benefits.58 Professor Kurland, in his instructive study of the Supreme
Court's decisions, propounded the theory that what the first amendment forbids is a classification which results in either preference or
discrimination based on the religious factor. 59 This theory, too, results in a neutralistic interpretation in the sense that laws and practices must be general in application and must not be designed to
favor or discriminate against religion.
In implementing the neutrality idea in Schempp, Justice Clark
said that the decisive test was whether either the purpose or the
primary effect of the enactment was the advancement or inhibition
of religion: "That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the
E~blishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and
a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 60 This
test fits in well with the neutrality idea-neutrality is identified with
secularity of both ends and means. The difficulty with Schempp is
that there is no indication in Justice Clark's opinion that the Court
was rejecting the Zorach case, where there was clearly a breach of
the neutrality idea in that the Court sanctioned a state program
which_ was deliberately designed to further the religious interests of
parents and children. Moreover, the emphasis in Justice Clark's
opinion on the compulsive aspects of the Bible-reading and prayer
exercises somewhat weakens the conclusion that these exercises were
invalid simply because they reflected a positive interest of the state
57. 343 U.S. at 314.
58 •. Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426 (1953).
59. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962).
60. 374 U.S. at 222.
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in religious matters. Instead, the opinion suggests that their invalidity turned on the element of coercion implicit in the school situation. This ambiguity is reflected also in the separate opinion of
Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Harlan. While agreeing that the
state must be neutral toward religion, nevertheless they warned that
an untutored devotion to neutrality could lead to results which partake of "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a
passive, or even active, hostility to the religious"-results which are
not only not compelled by the Constitution, but are prohibited by
it. 01 Justice Brennan, in a long concurring opinion expressing his
adherence to neutrality and the results reached in Engel and
Schempp, listed a whole series of cases where he thought the state
could accommodate these programs to serve religious interests.62 But
there can be no reconciliation between strict neutrality and the
neutrality which permits or requires an accommodation to religious
interests. 63 This difference is suggested by Justice Clark's opinion
in Schempp, where he spoke both of "strict neutrality, neither aiding
nor opposing religion," 64 and of "wholesome neutrality.'' 65
So while the Schempp case spoke much of neutrality, the various
opinions are ambiguous on this question. It is evident that not all
members of the Court are ready to accept the Kurland idea that the
state can do nothing which in any way uses the religious factor as
the basis for preferential classification. It seems clear that prayer and
Bible-reading practices have been held invalid not simply because
they violate the neutrality principle but because this particular
breach of neutrality has involved the states so deeply in i:eligious
matters as to have a coercive effect on the liberty of dissenters and
nonconformists. 66 Schempp can thus be viewed as a case protecting
the freedom of the miqqrity.
On the same day the Court decided the Schempp case, it held in
61. 374 U.S. at 306.
62. 374 U.S. at 294-304.
63. For analysis of the neutrality emphasis in the Schempp opinion, see Kauper,
Schempp and Sherbert, Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation, 1963 RELIGION AND
THE PUBLIC ORDER 3, 10-23. See also Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal De-l!elopment, Part II, The Xonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV.
513 (1968).
64. 374 U.S. at 225.
65. 374 U.S. at 222.
66. See, e.g., the stalement in Justice Goldberg's concuning opinion that the "per•
vasive religiosity and direct governmental inYolvement inhering in the prayer and
Bible-reading practices" could not be characterized simply as accommodation by the
~tatc in the interests of religious liberty. 374 l'.S. at 307.
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Sherbert 61 that as matter of constitutional right a Seventh Day
Adventist, because of her religion, was entitled to special treatment
under the South Carolina unemployment compensation law. Here
the Court approached the problem from the vantage point of the
free exercise clause. The deliberate legislative policy of giving aid
to religious groups through exemptions in tax and regulatory laws,
evident in both federal and state statutes, cannot be reconciled with
neutrality. Yet the Court in Sherbert went beyond saying that a
legislature may grant a preferential exclusion on religious grounds
and held that it must do so. The free exercise clause as interpreted
in Sherbert thus negates neutrality. At the same time, the constitutionally required accommodation to religious liberty does not in
this case ,violate the establishment clause-even though it departs
from neutrality-since here the state's involvement in i"digion is
minimal and the positive assistance given to -one ci:1:11:-en's religious
beliefs poses no threat to others' theistic or nontheistic beliefs.68
Schempp and Sherbert can be reconciled, not on the basis of an
abstract conception ·of neutrality, but on the basis that both serve to
protect important facets of the basic liberty that gives unity to the
religion clauses of the first amendment. Given this explanation,
Schempp was a significant contribution to the meaning of religious
liberty in our pluralistic society.
The decision in Allen, 69 holding that it does not violate the
establishment clause for a state to lend secular textbooks free of
charge to children in parochial schools, has important implicationseven though on the surface it adds nothing new to the interpretation
of the establishment limitation. Obviously the result fits the neutrality theory, since the state here elected to pursue a policy of not discriminating against parochial school children in the disbursement of
funds for educational purposes. On the other hand, it is quite clear
that Allen is not consistent with a s_trict separation theory, at least
in terms of the doctrinaire no-assistance idea expressed in Everson.
Yet it can be reconciled with the actual holding in Everson on the
ground that, even under a strict separation theory, the state is not
precluded from pursuing secular purpose programs which give incidental aid to religion. This is precisely the theory on which the
6i. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
68. 374 U.S. at 409. See Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment
Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968).
69. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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Allen case rests. Following the decision in the prayer and Biblereading cases, the question had arisen whether Everson was still good
law. Everson had been decided by a five-to-four vote, and Justice
Douglas, who voted with the majority, subsequently indicated that
he thought Everson had been wrongly decided. 70 A very substantial
change has occurred in the Court's personnel in the meantime. Of
the nine Justices who participated in Everson, only Justices Black
and Douglas are now on the bench. Both dissented in Allen along
with Justice Fortas. This means that the majority in the Allen case
consisted of six Justices who did not take part in Everson. Justice
'White, who delivered the majority opinion which received the support of five other Justices, rested the case squarely on the authority
of Everson and its sect1lar-purpose theory. 71 In this connection, he
also made a revealing use of the primary purpose-primary effect test
enunciated by Justice Clark in Schempp.
Allen does more than merely affirm Everson. It rejects the notion
that the Everson holding is limited to forms of aid for parochial
school children, such as transportation, school lunches, and health
programs which, unlike books, are not directly involved in the teaching and learning processes. Perhaps what is really important about
Allen is its affirmation of the role of private education in the American educational system, the recognition that parochial schools serve
a secular purpose in addition to their sectarian function, and the
clear acceptance of the idea that the establishment clause is no bar
to state assistance in furthering this secular function. 72
Allen opens up new vistas for application of the secular purpose
theory. It should be pointed out, however, that the Court has never
dealt with the question whether government may make direct grants
to church-related educaf~onal institutions on a theory of assisting
70. See his concurring opinion in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962).
71. 392 U.S. at 242-44.
72. 392 U.S. at 247-48 (footnotes omitted):
Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislative judgments that have
preceded the coun decisions, has been a recognition that private education has
played and is playing a significant and valuable role in raising national levels
of knowledge, competence, and experience. Americans care about the quality of
the secular education aYailable to their children. They have considered high quality
education to be an indispensable ingredient for achieving the kind of nation,
and the kind of citizenry, that they have desired to create. Considering this attitude, the continued willingness to rely on private school systems, including
parochial systems, strongly suggests that a wide segment of informed opinion,
legislative and otherwise, has found that those schools do an acceptable job of
providing secular education to their students. This judgment is further evidence
that parochial schools are performing, in addition to their sectarian function,
the task of secular education.
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them in the performance of secular functions. In Everson the school
board reimbursed the parents for the cost of students' transportation. In Allen the state supplied textbooks which had to be approved
by the state department of education although the parochial school
authorities made the initial choice (a point emphasized in the dissenting opinions). 73 Reserved for future decision is the question of
to what extent the concept of secular purpose or of neutrality, invoked to support various forms of governmental aid for parochial
school education, is limited by the manner in which the benefit is
conferred, the extent of state involvement in religious affairs, .and
the retention of public administrative control.74
The cases interpreting the establishment clause have done little
to resolve the conceptual ambiguities bequeathed by the pre-Warren
decisions. On the one hand, the Court, while continuing to pay
verbal respect to the strict-separation theory first emmciatecl. in
Everson, has used the opening provided by tnat case for the secular
purpose doctrine. I~ followed this theory in the Sunday closing cases
and in the school textbook cases. On the other hand, in Schempp
the Court formulated a neutrality theory as the central canon in the
construction of the establishment limitation. Yet we may wonder
what kind of neutrality the Court was talking about. Indeed, Justice
Harlan has recently observed that "[n]eutrality is a coat of many
colors."75 Because of the degree of state involvement, neutrality obviously suited the Schempp case as a theory for decision. But the Court
did not disavow Zorach, which rested on accommodation; and on
the very same day that it decided Schempp, it limited neutrality by
holding in Sherbert that a state was ·required in the name of free
exercise to grant a religious exemption from a law which served a
vali4 public purpose. Moreover, in Allen, where the Court could have
used neutrality as an adequate basis for decision, it chose instead to
pursue the secular purpose theory. In following and expanding
upon this theory, the Courf said nothing about the alternative73. 392 U.S. at 254-55, 269-70.
74. Answering the argument that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or
that the processes of secular and religious training are so intertwined that secular
textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching
of religion, the Court said in the Allen case that nothing in the record supported the
proposition that all textbooks are used by the parochial schools to teach religion. "We
are unable to hold, based solely on judicial notice, that this statute results in unconstitutional involvement of the State with religious instruction." 392 U.S. at 248.
See Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAUF. L.
REV. 260 (1968).
75. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968).
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means test which it had intimated in the Sunday closing cases was
a limitation on the application of the secular-purpose concept.76
IV.

CONCLUSION

On the whole there can be no serious quarrel ·with the results
reached by the ,varren Court in the cases arising under the religion
clauses of the first amendment. The Court, distinguished generally
for its emphasis on libertarian values, has been sensitive and hospitable to claims made in the name of religious liberty-which
encompasses a wide variety of values served by both the free exercise
and establishment clauses. The free exercise clause has been employed effectively to protect discrete minorities, dissenters, and nonbelievers. The "compelling considerations of public policy" test has
taken its place along with the "clear and present danger" test as a
judicial vehicle for invalidating both direct and indirect restraints
which operate in a substantial way to burden the free exercise of
religion. ·whatever other criticisms may be directed against the
·warren Court, a fair reading of these opinions should dispel the
notion that it has been hostile to religion.
A common thread running through the decisions under both of
the religion clauses is an awareness of and sensitivity to the demands
both for equality of treatment in a religiously pluralistic society and
for special protection of minority groups against the claims and assumptions of the majority. The prayer and Bible-reading cases must
ultimately rest on the cons~deration that religious exercises in public
schools, though sanctioned by the majority, constitute a substantial
threat to the liberty of nonconforming groups. Similarly, the Court's
decision in Allen reflects a judicial appreciation of the pluralistic
character of our educational system and the freedom of choice implicit within it.
Leaving aside the results, one may venture criticism of the way in
which the Court handled some of the cases. Braunfeld seems clearly
out of line with Sherbert, and it may be asked why the Court did not
overrule it in the latter decision instead of distinguishing it on
76. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
It may be argued abstractly that it is unnecessary for the state to help further the
fecular education of children attending parochial schools since they are free to attend
the public schools in order to obtain a secular education. Omission of any consideration of the alternative means test in Allen may suggest that this test has no relevancy
if the alternative means for achieving the intended public benefit requires the sacrifice
of important constitutional freedoms.
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grounds that are hardly persuasive. A large part of the public furor
aroused by Justice Black's blunt opinion in Engel might well have
been avoided if the Court had given thought to the public impact
of the decision and dealt more discreetly with the issue-as Justice
Clark did in the later Sche1J1,pp opinion. And, in turn, both decisions
would have been strengthened had the Court bottomed the holdings
on the psychologically coercive aspects of religious practices in the
classroom.
The earlier analysis of the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause points up the continued failure to resolve the ambiguities, if not inconsistencies, bequeathed by the opinions of the preWarren era. Although neutrality appears to have emerged as the
dominant theme, the cases reveal no clear perception of what is
meant by neutrality. How is it reconciled with the separation principle stressed in the language of Everson? Does neutrality yield to a
superior demand of religious liberty? Is there a difference between
"secular purpose" and "neutrality"? And is the Court prepared to
push the "alternative means" test as a limitation on secular purpose?
The resolution of these questions depends upon a systematic analysis
and ordering of the values implicit in the religion clauses of the first
amendment. This is a task the Warren Court will pass on to its
successor. Ironically, by opening up the floodgates to litigation in
the Flast decision, the Warren Court has made certain that the postWarren Court will have the opportunity to undertake this task.

